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Abstract
We measure the correlations between two cities’ real GDP growth rates (a measure of
business cycle correlations) to capture the degree of segmentation across China’s provincial
and regional borders. This type of segmentation can be caused by local protectionism
as well as other economic and geographic factors that affect business cycle correlations
between two cities. After controlling these other factors, we are able to pin down the
border effect that is due to local protectionism: administrative border effect. We find that
the inter-provincial administrative border effect first rose and then gradually declined in
the period between 1991 and 2007. Further, its increase coincided with the introduction of
the Tax Sharing System reform, which started in 1994. This administrative border effect
declined steadily in recent years as the tax reform was fully instituted. Our analysis shows
that China’s reform path (under market-preserving federalism) did not create a persistent
provincial “administrative border effect” that debilitated market forces.
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Abstract 
We measure the correlations between two cities’ real GDP growth rates (a measure of 
business cycle correlations) to capture the degree of segmentation across China’s 
provincial and regional borders.  This type of segmentation can be causd by local 
protectionism as well as other economic and geographic factors that affect business cycle 
correlations between two cities.  After controlling these other factors, we are able to pin 
down the border effect that is due to local protectionism: administrative border effect.  
We find that the inter-provincial administrative border effect first rose and then gradually 
declined in the period between 1991 and 2007.  Further, its increase coincided with the 
introduction of the Tax Sharing System reform, which started in 1994.  This 
administrative border effect declined steadily in recent years as the tax reform was fully 
instituted. Our analysis shows that China’s reform path (under market-preserving 
federalism) did not create a persistent provincial “administrative border effect” that 
debilitated market forces.  
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China’s Internal Borders:  
Evidence from the Business Cycle Correlations across Chinese Cities 
 
1. Introduction 
During the rise of free-market ideology in the past few deca s, many countries 
underwent reforms toward privatization and shifted from a planned scheme to a market 
mode.  Different countries followed diverse approaches to direct their economic 
transition.  For example, Russia brought a “sudden death” approach to the central-
planned economy, while China relied on gradual reforms to move toward a market 
system.  Regardless of the approach taken, economists often measure the d gree of 
market integration to assess the success of these tremendous transformations.  If the shift 
to a market mode is successful and indeed market forces prevail in the end, then one 
would expect to see a strong degree of market integration.  For example, Berkowitz and 
DeJong (2001, 2002, and 2003) found that after radical price reforms, Russian’s dome tic 
market integration improved between 1994 and 1999.  However, this trend was reversed 
later.  Interestingly, they also found a significant negative relationship between domestic 
market integration and openness to international trade. 
The case of China, another large economy in transition, is very different. Instead 
of employing the “sudden death” approach, China started with gradual experimentation 
on issues like price reforms.  During this process, the central government gave local 
(provincial) governments unprecedented authority to manage local eonomies.  
Montinola, Qian, and Weingast (1996) named this Chinese approach market-pres rving 
federalism.  Many argue that the competition among Chinese provinces i  this federalism 
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framework is the key to China’s success in moving toward a market system.  However, 
the type of organizations that helped propel the move toward markets can also hinder the 
function of market forces, eventually becoming a roadblock to market development.  
Lyons (1985) argued that Chinese administrative organizations seemed to have created “a 
cellular economy” in which provincial governments not only have independent rights to 
distribute administrative and economic resources but also have tremendous influence 
over the business environment. As reforms deepened, local protectionism emerged as 
well.   
Russia’s case indicates that the trend of market integration in the free-market 
economic transition is not unidirectional.  Does China also exhibit the same 
characteristics, even though China’s approach has been different?  Given China’s 
administrative organization, have reforms improved the degree of market integration?  Is 
the force of the market stronger than the barriers resulting from local protectionism? 
Recent academic studies did not reach a consensus.  Some found that market 
fragmentation has worsened as reforms deepened (Young 2000; Poncet 2003 and 2005). 
Others agree that although market segmentation still exists in China, the trend toward 
market integration is nevertheless improving (Tang 1998; Xu 2002; Naughton 2003; Bai, 
Du, Tao and Tong 2004; Fan and Wei 2006; Holz 2009; and Qi 2009, among others).   
This paper uses the new approach of border effect to examine the dynamic trend 
of market integration in China.  Borders are generally defined either as boundaries 
between different administrative units such as provinces or as the geographic borders of 
different countries.  Since our study focuses on domestic market integration, we use the 
term “borders” in the sense of boundaries of the administrative units (provinces).  The 
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border effect not only affects trade volumes between various regions (countries) 
(McCallum 1995), but also manifests in the correlations of business cycles between 
regions (countries). In general, strong border effects lead to a low correlation of business 
cycles in different regions (thus indicating a lower degree of market integration in these 
regions). For example, Clark and Wincoop (2001) examined correlations of output (or 
employment) to measure business synchronization within the U.S. and among European 
countries. They discovered that the within-country correlations of busines  cycles are 
much higher than the inter-country correlations among European countries, thus 
demonstrating lower market integration as a result of the border effect in Europe. 
This paper uses the methodology developed by Clark and Wincoop (2001) to 
measure the border effect among the different provinces within China, and investigates 
specific factors that affect the magnitude of border effects.  We calculate the pair-wise 
GDP growth rate correlation coefficients among 204 Chinese cities, and obtain the 
weighted averages of these correlation coefficients of cities w thin a province as well as 
those of cities across provincial borders.  
We define the difference between these two correlations as the overall border 
effect across Chinese provinces.  This approach has several advantages.  First, it allows 
us to report the dynamic trend of border effect in different time periods, unlike previous 
studies that can draw only a binary conclusion (i.e., integrated vs. not integrated).  
Second, some existing studies  attempting to measure integration based on the law of one 
price had to use CPI indexes as opposed to prices on specific commodities due to lack of 
data.  But the use of CPI does not truly embody the principle of the law of one price.   
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Finally, our approach allows us to decompose the overall border effect we defined 
in order to pin down the specific causes of market segmentation (or the lack of 
correlations in business cycles).  The mere presence of segmentation does not 
automatically indicate local protectionism. Besides local protecti nism, other geographic 
and economic factors can also affect business synchronizations between various regions.   
In this study, we use a regression model in which the independent variable is the 
correlation between the GDP growth rates of two cities, and the explanatory variables are 
a series of economic and geographic factors that may affect this correlation between 
cities (such as the geographic distance between cities and the size of each city).  Further, 
we include factors that could affect trade volumes between provinces: the differences in 
the industrial structure between two cities, the differences in each city’s ratio of fiscal 
expenditure to GDP, the differences in the amount of FDI each city receives, etc.  By 
controlling these factors that decompose the business cycle synchronization between 
cities, the residual border effect is an estimate of the magnitude of segmentation due to 
barriers set by local government policies, i.e., the administrative border effect. 
We find that the inter-provincial administrative border effect first rose and then 
gradually declined in the period between 1991 and 2007.  Further, the increase of this 
type of border effect coincided with the introduction of the Tax Sharing System reform, 
which started in 1994.  This border effect declined steadily in recent years as the tax 
reform was fully instituted.  Our analysis shows that China’s reform path (under market-
preserving federalism) did not create a persistent provincial “administrative border 
effect” that debilitated market forces. In fact, we discover that other economic factors that 
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decrease market integration are just as strong (or even stronger in some cases) as the 
administrative border effect. 
Section 2 of this paper introduces the measurement of border effect in China and 
describes the trend of overall border effect in the period between 1990 and 2007.  We 
focus our discussion on the provincial border effect as well as the regional border effect 
among the three regions of East, Middle, and West.  Section 3 provides an analysis of 
factors that affect the overall border effect, and presents a regression model that 
decomposes the business cycle correlations (overall border effect) to estimate the 
magnitude of segmentation caused by economic and geographic factors as well as by 
local government behavior. Section 4 presents our conclusions. 
 
2. Border Effect within China 
We take the historical GDP data on 204 Chinese cities for the period of 1990–
2007 (from volumes of China Urban Statistical Yearbook and China Economic 
Information Network) and then convert nominal GDP growth rates to real terms using 
CPI data for the same time period. After taking the natural log of these real GDP growth 
rates, we apply the Hodrick-Prescott filter to remove any long-term trends from these 
growth rates.  Our data covers 30 out of 31 provinces and municipal cities in China (the 
only exception being Tibet).  Table 1 shows the number of cities included in our data set 
for each province. 
We calculated pair-wise correlation coefficients of the real GDP growth rates 
between two cities.  This generated 20706 correlation coefficients, among which 902 are 
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correlations between two cities that are located within the same province; the remaining 
19804 correlation coefficients are between cities that are located in different provinces. 
We define the overall border effect dummy variable as 1 if two cities are located 
in the same province, and 0 if they are not.  The overall border effect is represented as the 
estimated coefficient in the regression below:  
Eq. (1):   
where Corrij is the correlation coefficient of the real GDP growth rates b tween city i and 
city j, Borderij is the border effect dummy variable, and βij is the overall border effect. 
Table 2 demonstrates the growth correlations between cities located in the same 
province (i.e. intra-provincial correlation) as well as cities located in different provinces 
(inter-provincial correlation), and the magnitude of the estimated ovrall border effect in 
various time periods.  We also plot the results in Figure 1 to show te trend of these 
coefficients. 
(Insert Table 2 and Figure 1 here.) 
The average intra-provincial correlation is .18 for the period of 1991 to 2007, while 
the inter-provincial correlation is .11.  Thus the overall border effect for this period is .07.  
We then separate our sample into two periods, 1991–1998 and 1999–2007, because in 
general 1998 marked the beginning of further deepened market reforms in China.  In the 
early period of 1991–1998, the estimated overall border effect is .07, but segmentation 
seems to increase to .11 for the later time period.  
The simple averages do not reflect the relative importance of each city in China’s 
economy.  We calculate the ratio of a city’s GDP to the overall combined GDP figure of 
ij ijCorr Borderij ij ijα β ε= + +
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all 204 cities in our data set, and use that ratio to weight the corr lation coefficients 
among cities. Table 3 and Figure 2 illustrate the weighted average results. 
(Insert Table 3 and Figure 2 here.) 
The overall border effect with the weighted average approach comes t  be .08 for 
the whole sample period (from 1991 to 2007), while the overall border effect in both sub-
periods is approximately .10, contrary to the increasing trend for the later period, shown 
by the simple average approach.  In order to describe the dynamic trend of both simple 
average and weighted average border effect within China, we calculate the overall border 
effect with a rolling window of 10 years starting from 1991. The results are presented in 
Table 4 and Table 5. 
(Insert Table 4 and Table 5 here.) 
Both tables show a trend of increasing segmentation in China, especially in the two 
most recent rolling windows.  Figures 1 and 2 also demonstrate the same trend. 
In addition to inter-provincial overall border effect, we also examine the inter-
regional overall border effect among the Eastern, Middle, and Western regions.1  Most of 
the Eastern provinces in China are located on the coast.  We performed the same 
correlation tests on the GDP growth rates between every pair of two cities, among which 
7723 are intra-regional correlations (i.e. East to East, West to West, and Middle to 
Middle), and 12983 are inter-regional correlations.  Table 6 shows that the verage intra-
regional correlation in the period of 1991 to 2007 is .13, while the average inter-regional 
correlation is .1.  Therefore, the regional border effect is .03.   
                                                
1 The Eastern region includes Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, 
Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, Guangxi and Hainan.  The Middle region includes Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, 
Jilin, Xiangsu, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei and Hunan.  The Western region includes Chongqing, 




We further divide the sample into two sub-periods: before 1998 and after 1998.  We 
find that the overall border effect in the period between 1991 and 1998 is .06.  
Interestingly, however, the border effect basically disappears in the later period (1999 to 
2007), dropping to -.01 and becoming statistically insignificant as well.  The weighted 
average results of regional overall border effect demonstrate the sam  trend; Table 7 
shows a rather high border effect (.11) from 1991 to 1998, but the border effect becomes 
statistically insignificant in the later period, decreasing to -.03.  Tables 8 and 9 as well as 
Figures 3 and 4 present the dynamic trend of the regional overall border effect using the 
same “rolling window” methods used for Figures 1 and 2.  Readers can ee the declining 
trend of regional border effect in these figures.  In fact, in the last two windows (1997 to 
2006, and 1998 to 2007), the regional border effect becomes close to zero or negative 
(and also turns out to be statistically insignificant). 
Overall, we find that the inter-provincial border effect increases with time and has 
seemed to accelerate in recent years, thus indicating that market segmentation has risen as 
reforms deepened. On the contrary, the inter-regional border effect has been decreasing, 
and nearly disappeared in recent years.  The declining trend in the i ter-regional border 
effect may not be surprising.  In 2000, China started a policy to “Develop the West.”  
This policy significantly boosted infrastructure investment in underdeveloped areas, 
injecting large amounts of government funds.  This development policy also aimed to 
attract large amounts of private capital to China’s interior provinces. Such efforts have 
helped close the gap of economic growth between the Eastern regio and the Middle and 
West regions, which will increase the inter-regional correlation.  Moreover, the regional 
distinction is more of a geographic concept.  It has no connection to the administrative or 
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jurisdictional boundaries.  Interestingly enough, however, among provinces—which do 
have independent rights to administer and distribute resources—the overall border effect 
(segmentation) has increased steadily as economic reforms deepened in China.  What, 
then, contributes to the increase in the overall provincial border effect?   
 
3. Decomposing the Market Segmentation: Factors that Affect the Border Effect 
 Business cycle theories (Wynne and Koo 2000; Frankel and Rose 1998) attribute 
the correlation of two areas’ economic growth mainly to the trade volumes between the 
two areas.  Therefore, all factors that affect trade across b rders would be manifested 
directly or indirectly in the border effect. For this reason, we cannot interpret the 
magnitude of the overall border effect described in Section 2 as the segmentation caused 
by local protectionism, as we have not controlled for the other factors that also affect the 
overall border effect. 
 Trade theory and literature generally holds that the volume of trade between cities 
is affected by both the geographic distance between the cities as well as the size of the 
cities (McCallum 1995; Helliwell 1996; Clark and Wincoop 2001; Anderson and 
Wincoop 2003; Okubo 2004, among others). We used Google Earth to obtain the 
longitude and latitude of each city and then calculated the distance between any two cities 





































































where distance is the geographic distance between city i and city j.  The unit of distance 
is kilometers. longitudei, latitudei, longitudej,and latitudej represent each city i and j ’s 
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longitude and latitude. Our data set yields 18336 pairs2 of city-distance measures. We use 
the definition proposed by Clark and Wincoop (2001) to calculate the size of cities, i.e., 
the natural log of the sum of the population in each pair of cities. 
 In addition to distance and city size, we also control other factors that could 
potentially affect the correlation of real GDP growth rates btween any two cities.  These 
include: 1) the differences in the industrial structure between two cities; 2) the differences 
in fiscal expenditure; and 3) the differences in the amount of FDI each city receives. 
 We adopt the Absolute Value Index developed by Krugman (1991) to measure the 
industrial structure differences between any two cities.  Sin (where n = 1, 2, or 3) 
represents the ratio of the output by the first (or second or tertiary) industry to total output 
in city i.  The Absolute Value Index that describes the industrial structure difference 
between city i and city j is: 
 Eq. (3): 332211 jijijiij
SSSSSSAVI −+−+−=
 
 Controlling for the industrial structure difference is important as different 
industries will react differently when there is a common fiscal shock or a common 
monetary policy shock.  On the other hand, one can also argue that the causal effect can 
run both ways between market integration and the geographic distribution of first, 
second, and tertiary industries.  For example, under the condition of economies of scale 
and the agglomeration effect, market integration could lead to specialization, which will 
then affect industry structure.  In order to control for this potential issue, we use the 
average values of the industrial structural difference indexes to reduce the endogeneity in 
our regression. 
                                                
2 This comes from 192 cities in our data set.  Although we had economic data on 204 cities, only 
192 of them yielded complete data. 
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 We use the standard deviations of the differences between the ratios of a city’s 
fiscal expenditure to its GDP to measure the differences in fical expenditure.  We define 
Fit as the ratio of city i’s fiscal expenditure to its GDP where t represents years.  Thus, the 
difference between the fiscal expenditure between city i and city j is the standard 
deviation of (Fit – Fjt ) where t= 1, 2,…T….  Other things being equal, the difference 
between two cities’ fiscal expenditure will lower the correlation of real GDP growth rates 
between these two cities. 
 We calculate the differences in the amount of FDI each city receives with a 
similar approach as the one adopted for the fiscal expenditure differences.  Instead of 
using the ratio of fiscal expenditure to GDP, we use the ratio of FDI to GDP.  Attracting 
more FDI helps accelerate economic growth in a region.  Therefore, higher differences in 
FDI are likely to create a lower correlation of economic growth between cities. 
 Our regression model is: 
Eq. (4):  
ijijijijijijijijij FDIFiscalIndustrailPopulationSizecedisLnBordercorr εββββββα +++++++=
654321 )()tan(  
where  
Corrij is the correlation of the real GDP growth rates between two cities; 
Borderij is the dummy variable to indicate whether the pair of cities ar within the 
same province; 
Ln(Distance) is the natural log of the distance between two cities; 
Size (Population) is the size of a city; 
Industrial is the difference in the industrial structure of two cities; 
Fiscal is the difference in fiscal expenditure between two cities; and 
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FDI is the difference in the amount of FDI two cities receive. 
After controlling these economic and geographical factors in the regression, the 
coefficient of the variable Borderij will approximately reflect the market segmentation 
due to local protective administrative policies (i.e., the administrat ve border effect as 
opposed to the “overall” border effect calculated in Section 2). 
 Table 10 presents the regression results.  The estimate for the administrative 
border effect between 1991 and 2007 is .05 and statistically significant.  In the two sub-
sample periods, this border effect is .04 for the early period (1991 to 1998) and increases 
to .06 in the later period (1999 to 2007).  Thus local protectionism (built upon local 
administrative powers) seems to worsen as the economic reforms deepen, resulting in 
higher market fragmentation. 
 We further analyze the dynamic patterns of the administrative border effect using 
samples under “rolling windows.”  Actually, we find that it first increased but then 
declined gradually, starting in the window of 1995 to 2004.  Our estimates for the 
administrative border effects of 10-year rolling window are: 
 .034 for the period of 1991 to 2000 
 .038 for the period of 1992 to 2001 
 .052 for the period of 1993 to 2002 
 .097 for the period of 1994 to 2003 
 .090 for the period of 1995 to 2004 
 .06 for the period of 1996 to 2005 
 .05 for the period of 1997 to 2006 




After a dramatic increase between the periods from (1993 to 2002) and (1994 to 
2003), the administrative border effect dropped significantly in the last ten years in the 
data set, to about .05. This trend is presented in Figure 4. All estimates for this border 
effect are positive and statistically significant in our analysis.  Interestingly, we find that 
the timing of the initial rapid increase of this kind of border effect coincides with the 
beginning of the tax reforms (Tax Sharing System – TSS) introduced in 1994.  Prior to 
the TSS, the fiscal contracting system (caizheng chengbao zhi) was used, under which 
local governments held more authority and control.  They had great incenives to collect 
tax revenues and develop local economies, and obtained an increased sh r  of fiscal 
resources because the most important contracts of shared revenue betwe n central and 
local governments were fixed in nominal terms, thus also giving local governments the 
incentives to conceal their revenue capacities.   
The new system, TSS, fundamentally changed how central and local governments 
share revenues. Most taxes were assigned to either the central or local governments.  The 
motivation for introducing TSS stemmed largely from the central government’s concern 
about its fiscal decline. In that regard, a major goal of the new TSS system was to restore 
the center’s control and strength. The changes introduced by TSS met with resistance 
from the provinces, who feared losing local revenues. In turn, the centr offered to return 
part of the shared revenues to ensure that provincial revenues would not drop below 1993 
levels. The resistance subsided, and the system finally gained prominence after 1996, 
which again coincides with the declining administrative border effect in our regression 
results.   
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Our analysis shows that China’s reform path (under market-preserving 
federalism) did not create a persistent provincial administrative border effect that 
debilitated market forces.  Indeed, the local governments practiced sronger protectionist 
policies in some periods, but it was mostly in reaction to a major n tionwide tax reform. 
The protectionism under the current economic system and organization of administrative 
powers eventually yielded to the stronger market forces. Table 10 also shows that the 
inter-provincial administrative border effect did exist to a degre , affecting market 
integration, but the magnitude of other economic and geographic factors that decrease 
market integration is just as strong (if not stronger in some cass) as the administrative 
border effect.  
 Table 10 also shows that most of the control variables not only turn out to be
statistically significant, but also have the expected signs predicted by theories.  For 
example, differences in industrial structure, fiscal expenditure, and FDI all affect the 
correlation of economic growth among cities.  The first two factors (industrial structural 
diversity and fiscal expenditure difference) negatively impact the correlation, indicating 
that higher differences reduce the correlation between cities.  However, it is intriguing 
that more differences in FDI actually have a positive impact on the growth correlation, 
although such an impact diminishes as we approach more recent years. 
 Table 11 decomposes the inter-regional segmentation to estimate bord r effect 
with similar controls on geographic and economic variables.  The regression model is: 
Eq. (5): 
 ijijijijijijijijij FDIFiscalIndustrailPopulationSizecedisLnBordercorr εββββββα +++++++=
654321 )()tan(  
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where the dummy variable Borderij takes on the value 1 if two cities are located in the 
same region, and 0 if they are not. Using sample data with the “rolling window” of ten 
years, we find that the inter-regional administrative border effect has been declining 
steadily from the first year included in the data, even becoming negative during the 
periods of 1997 to 2006 and 1998 to 2007.  Figure 6 plots the estimates of regional border 
effect.  Moreover, the inter-regional administrative border effects are not statistically 




 We measure the correlations between two cities’ real GDP growth rates (a 
measure of business cycle correlations) to capture the degree of segmentation across 
China’s provincial and regional borders.  This type of segmentation can be caused by 
local protectionism as well as other economic and geographic factors that affect business 
cycle correlations between two cities.  After controlling these oth r factors, we are able to 
pin down the border effect that is due to local protectionism: administrative border effect.  
We find that the inter-provincial administrative border effect first rose and then gradually 
declined between 1991 and 2007.  Further, its increase coincided with the introduction of 
the Tax Sharing System reform, which started in 1994.  However, th  si uation of 
segmentation related to administrative border effect has improved stea ily in recent 
years, once the tax reform was fully instituted.  Our analysis shows that China’s reform 
path (under market-preserving federalism) did not create a persistent provincial 
“administrative border effect” that debilitated market forces. Compared with the inter-
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provincial border effect in China, the inter-regional border effect has declined 
continuously and virtually disappeared in recent years. These findings contribute to our 
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(in Section 3) 








(in Section 3) 
Beijing 1 1  Zhejiang 9 9 Hainan 2 2 
Tianjin 1 1  Anhui 11 11 Sichuan 12 12 
Hebei 9 9  Fujian 8 8 Chongqing 1 1 
Shanxi 6 6  Jiangxi 6 6 Guizhou 3 2 
Inner 
Mongolia 
4 4  Shandong 14 14 Yunnan 2 1 
Liangning 13 13  Henan 14 13 Shannxi 7 7 
Jilin 6 6  Hubei 8 8 Gansu 5 3 
Heilongjiang 10 10  Hunan 11 10 Ningxia 2 2 
Shanghai 1 1  Guangdong 15 15 Qinghai 1 1 





Table 2: Simple Average Real GDP Growth Rates Corre lation Coefficients of Cities Located 
in the Same Province (intra-provincial correlation)  vs. Cities Located in Different Provinces 
(inter-provincial correlation) 
 




Estimated Overall  
Provincial 
Border effect βij  
1991-2007 0.18*** 0.11*** 0.07*** 
    
1991-1998 0.24*** 0.17*** 0.07*** 
    
1999-2007 0.17*** 0.06*** 0.11*** 
    
 










Table 3 Weighted Average Real GDP Growth Rates Corr elation Coefficients of Cities 
Located in the Same Province (intra-provincial corr elation) vs. Cities Located in Different 
Provinces (inter-provincial correlation)  
 






Border effect βij 
1991-2007 0.21 0.14 0.08 
    
1991-1998 0.35 0.24 0.10 
    
1999-2007 0.13 0.03 0.10 










Table 4 Simple Average Real GDP Growth Rates Correlation Co efficients of Cities Located 
in the Same Province (intra-provincial correlation)  vs. Cities Located in Different Provinces 
(inter-provincial correlation) – Rolling Window of 10 Years  
 
 







Border effect βij 
1991-2000             0.22                       0.15                       0.07  
    
1992-2001             0.21                       0.15                       0.06  
    
1993-2002             0.19                       0.12                       0.07  
    
1994-2003             0.15                       0.07                       0.09  
    
1995-2004             0.19                       0.11                       0.08  
    
1996-2005             0.16                       0.07                       0.08  
    
1997-2006             0.16                       0.06                       0.09  
    
1998-2007             0.17                       0.07                       0.10  
    
 

















Table 5 Weighted Average Real GDP Growth Rates Correlation Coeffici ents of Cities 
Located in the Same Province (intra-provincial corr elation) vs. Cities Located in Different 
Provinces (inter-provincial correlation) – Rolling Window of 10 Years  
 







Border effect βij 
1991-2000 0.27 0.20 0.08 
    
1992-2001 0.26 0.18 0.08 
    
1993-2002 0.21 0.15 0.06 
    
1994-2003 0.18 0.08 0.10 
    
1995-2004 0.21 0.11 0.11 
    
1996-2005 0.17 0.07 0.10 
    
1997-2006 0.13 0.02 0.10 
    








Table 6: Simple Average Real GDP Growth Rates Corre lation: Intra-regional vs. Inter-
regional 
  







Border Effect βij 
1991-2007 0.13*** 0.10*** 0.03*** 
    
1991-1998 0.21*** 0.15*** 0.06*** 
    
1999-2007 0.06*** 0.07*** -0.01 
    
 






Table 7 Weighted Average Real GDP Growth Rates Corr elation: Intra-regional vs. Inter-
regional 







Border Effect βij 
1991-2007 0.21 0.15 0.06 
    
1991-1998 0.33 0.22 0.11 
    







Table 8: Simple Average Real GDP Growth Rates Corre lation: Intra-regional vs. Inter-
regional – Rolling Window o 10 Years 
 







Border Effect βij 
1991-2000 0.18*** 0.14*** 0.05*** 
    
1992-2001 0.17*** 0.14*** 0.04*** 
    
1993-2002 0.14*** 0.10*** 0.04*** 
    
1994-2003 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.02*** 
    
1995-2004 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.02*** 
    
1996-2005 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.01*** 
    
1997-2006 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.00 
    
1998-2007 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.00 
    
 








Table 9 Weighted Average Real GDP Growth Rates Corr elation: Intra-regional vs. Inter-
regional – Rolling Window o 10 Years 
 







Border Effect βij 
1991-2000 0.29 0.22 0.08 
    
1992-2001 0.28 0.21 0.07 
    
1993-2002 0.24 0.17 0.07 
    
1994-2003 0.14 0.10 0.04 
    
1995-2004 0.17 0.12 0.04 
    
1996-2005 0.07 0.05 0.02 
    
1997-2006 0.02 0.05 -0.03 
    













Border Distance Size(Population) Production Fiscal FDI 
1991-2007 0.05*** -0.01*** 0.00 0.00*** -0.83*** 0.15*** 
       
1991-1998 0.04** -0.02*** 0.02*** 0.00*** -0.37*** 0.34*** 
       
1999-2007 0.06*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 0*** -0.03 0.06 
       
       
1991-2000 0.03** -0.02*** 0.01 0*** -0.51*** 0.27*** 
       
1992-2001 0.04** -0.02*** 0 0*** -0.68*** 0.26*** 
       
1993-2002 0.05*** -0.01*** 0.01 0 -1.08*** 0.19*** 
       
1994-2003 0.10*** 0 0 0** -0.85*** 0.07 
       
1995-2004 0.09*** 0 0 0*** -0.88*** -0.05 
       
1996-2005 0.06*** -0.02*** 0 0** -0.85*** 0.10** 
       
1997-2006 0.05*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 0*** -0.76*** 0 
       
1998-2007 0.05*** -0.03*** -0.02*** 0*** -0.36** 0 
       
 














Period Border Distance Size(Population) Production Fiscal FDI 
1991-2007 0.03*** -0.02*** 0.00 -0.00*** -0.82*** 0.15*** 
       
1991-1998 0.05*** -0.02*** 0.02*** -0.00*** -0.38*** 0.33*** 
       
1999-2007 -0.01** -0.04*** -0.02*** -0.00*** -0.04 0.06 
       
       
1991-2000 0.04*** -0.02*** 0.01 -0.00*** -0.51*** 0.25*** 
       
1992-2001 0.04*** -0.02*** 0.00 -0.00*** -0.68*** 0.25*** 
       
1993-2002 0.04*** -0.02*** 0.01 -0.00 -1.07*** 0.18*** 
       
1994-2003 0.02*** -0.01** 0.00 -0.00** -0.82*** 0.07 
       
1995-2004 0.02*** -0.01** -0.00 -0.00*** -0.86*** -0.05 
       
1996-2005 0.01** -0.02*** -0.00 -0.00** -0.83** 0.10** 
       
1997-2006 -0.01 -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.00*** -0.74*** 0.00 
       
1998-2007 -0.01 -0.04*** -0.02*** -0.00*** -0.35** 0.01 
       
 
Note: *** denotes 1% significance level, ** denotes 5% significant level and * denotes 10% significance 
level. 
 
 
